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Abstract. A linguistic analysis of deontic paradoxes can be used to further de-
velop deontic logic. In this paper we provide a Beth-Reichenbach semantics to
analyze deontic paradoxes, and we illustrate it on the single agent decision prob-
lem of the miners scenario. We also introduce extensions with reactive arrows
and actions, which can be used to give a linguistic interpretation of multi-agent
dialogues.
1 Introduction
Consider the following discussion by Condoravdi and van der Torre [6].
“Example (Linguistic interpretation of Chisholm’s paradox) The most no-
torious story from the deontic logic literature is known as Chisholm’s paradox:
1. a certain man ought to go to the assistance of his neighbours,
2. if he goes, he ought to tell them he is coming,
3. if he does not go, he ought not to tell them he is coming,
4. he does not go.
Analyses of the three conditional obligations have led to preference-based de-
ontic logic, temporal deontic logic, action deontic logic, non-monotonic deon-
tic logic, and more. A more general linguistic analysis would also question the
fourth sentence: what does it mean that the man does not go? Does it mean
that he cannot go, that he intends not to go, or that he did not go? Taking into
account the temporal perspective of the fourth premise and, more generally,
the context in which the reasoning takes place constitutes new challenges for
the logical analysis of the paradox.” [6]
The example of Condoravdi and van der Torre suggests that a linguistic analysis of de-
ontic paradoxes can be used to further develop the logic of obligations and permissions.
In this paper, we take up their challenge, and we start the development of a semantics
for such a linguistic interpretation. We use the following fragment of the miners sce-
nario1 to motivate, develop and validate our approach. As in the analysis of Chisholm’s
1 Kolodny and MacFarlane [12] and Willer [16] call it a paradox, while Cariani et al. [3] call it
a puzzle. In this paper, we do not consider the question whether it is a paradox, and call it “the
miners scenario.”
paradox above, we consider not only the obligations, but also the temporal perspective
of the factual premise and, more generally, the context in which the reasoning takes
place.
Example 1 (Miners scenario, single agent decision problem). The miners scenario is
introduced by Kolodny and MacFarlane [12]. Ten miners are trapped either in shaft A
or in shaft B, but we do not know which one. Water threatens to flood the shafts. We only
have enough sandbags to block one shaft but not both. If one shaft is blocked, all of the
water will go into the other shaft, killing every miner inside. If we block neither shaft,
both will be partially flooded, killing one miner. The decision problem is summarised
in the following table:
Action if miners in A if miners in B
block shaft A all saved all drowned
block shaft B all drowned all saved
block neither shaft one drowned one drowned
Lacking any information about the miners’ exact whereabouts, and without the possi-
bility to obtain such information, it seems acceptable to say that:
(1) a. We ought to block neither shaft.
b. If the miners are in shaft A, we ought to block shaft A.
c. If the miners are in shaft B, we ought to block shaft B.
d. Either the miners are in shaft A or they are in shaft B.
However, (1.a-d). seem to entail (2), contradicting (1.a).
(2) Either we ought to block shaft A or we ought to block shaft B.
Various consistent representations of the scenario have been given [12, 3, 4, 16, 5].
Moreover, Kolodny and MacFarlane [12] extend the single agent decision problem
above to multi-agent dialogues, leading to additional logical developments. While these
representations focus on the interpretation of deontic modality and conditionals in the
first three sentences, leading to new developments in deontic logic like information
sensitivity, decision rules, and dynamic semantics, we use in this paper ideas from intu-
itionistic logic [15] and reactive Kripke semantics [11] to form a new analysis focussing
on the fourth sentence.
Research question Which semantics can be used to give a linguistic analysis of para-
doxes and use of normative language, and thus to further develop deontic logic?
This general objective breaks down into the following three subquestions:
1. How to define a special Beth-Reichenbach semantics capable of analyzing the min-
ers scenario?
2. How to augment the Beth-Reichenbach semantics with reactive arrows and sharpen
our analysis of the miners scenario?
3. How to further extend the Beth-Reichenbach semantics to obtain a logic capable of
modeling actions in the miners scenario?
Our linguistic analysis questions the disjunction in the fourth sentence. For example,
is this information relevant at the current moment or in a reference time later in the
narrative of the story? If we read the wording of the miners scenario and the natural
flow of events involved in the situation described by the scenario, we have a story about
what we know at the beginning (namely, we do not know where the miners are), we
have actions we want to take (block the shafts) which intuitively we should not be
taking until we know where the miners are, and when we know where the miners are
we immediately have the obligation to take the proper action. Our use of the Beth-
Reichenbach semantics starts by observing that, on a temporal perspective, disjunctions
represent limited information. We do not know where the miners are, so we are only
able to state a disjunction that “enumerates” the places where they could be: shaft A and
shaft B. Therefore, we need a logical account where disjunctions are interpreted in that
way, regardless of the actions that the agent will decide to take.
Classical logic does not have components to model the desired semantics at the
object level. We need to somehow add to classical logic, at the object level, a component
of knowledge, time, and actions in a natural way, where by “natural” we mean a way
which mirrors our human perception of the story. Classical logic can describe the above
flow of knowledge, time and actions only by acting as a meta-language, but when it is
used as a meta-language, it can equally describe the cooking of an omelette. This is not
what we mean by a natural logic to represent the miners scenario. We therefore do not
move from classical logic to the machinery of the temporal modal action logic [2], as a
sort of meta-language to describe the miners scenario [12, 3, 4]. Instead, we modify the
traditional semantics for classical logic by moving to the Beth-Reichenbach semantics.
In this paper we do not introduce a full-fledged deontic logic, as there are various
ways to use the Beth-Reichenbach semantics for normative reasoning. For example, we
can add a modal operator for obligation to the semantics, to obtain a kind of intuition-
istic standard deontic logic, or we can use the intuitionistic logic as the base logic in
the input/output logic framework [8]. We leave these developments for further research,
and focus in this paper on the linguistic interpretation of the miners scenario.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present the Beth-Reichenbach
semantics for classical logic. In section 3, we present our case study of the miners sce-
nario. In section 4 we introduce reactive arrows and in section 5, we introduce actions.
Section 6 formalizes the miners scenario and section 7 compares our representation of
the miners scenario with the literature. We conclude in section 8.
2 The Beth-Reichenbach semantics for classical logic
In this paper our starting point is propositional logic. Therefore for brevity we only
introduce the propositional fragment of Beth-Reichenbach semantics. Drawing from
Reichenbach [14], Beth [1] introduced his semantics in 1956 as a candidate semantics
for intuitionistic logic, and it is combined with Kripke semantics to form the Beth-
Kripke semantics [9]. It became popular as the semantics of intuitionistic logic. Finite
Beth-Reichenbach models comprize semantics for classical logic. The basic idea of
finite Beth-Reichenbach models can be described by the following example.
Example 2 (Police scenario). Imagine a police officer collecting evidence on a murder
case and preparing a file for the prosecution of a certain suspect for the murder. At
any given moment of time the police officer can go in different directions collecting
evidence and according to what he finds, different statements can be verified to be true.
There are three options for a statement A:
(a) There is enough evidence now to prove A.
(b) It is clear now that no matter how our investigations will proceed, there will not be
enough evidence to prove that A is true; therefore for the purpose of prosecution it
is acceptable that ¬A is true.
(c) Although there is not enough evidence to establish thatA is true, it may be possible
in the future that some new evidence will be uncovered that will establish the truth
of A. Therefore neither A nor ¬ A are established as true now.
The police has a deadline by which time the investigation and the prosecution file has
to be prepared, and therefore the model is finite.
A Beth-Reichenbach model is an overview of the different states of evidence in the
investigation. It is a finite ordered set with the relation ‘≤’ such that ‘t≤s’ means that
s has more established evidence than t. Thus if at t statement A can be proven true,
it could be also be proven true at s. Such a finite Beth-Reichenbach model provides
semantics for classical logic, because if we look at the endpoints of the process, namely
all the possible files where no further investigation and collection of evidence is per-
formed, we get a classical model. What is true in that final node is what can be proven
and what is false in that final node is what cannot be proven (which may be seen as a
kind of close world assumption). There are some immediate properties of this mental
picture:
(a) The nodes together with ≤ relation forms an acyclic order (for example a tree-
structure) with finite depth.
(b) If a statement is proven at moment t, then it will remain proven later than t.
(c) To prove a statement of the form “not ϕ” at moment t, the policeman must be
certain that no matter what further investigation is done: ϕ will never be proven. In
other words, “¬ϕ” is proven at moment t iff ϕ is not proven later than t.
(d) A statement of the form “ϕ or ψ” is proven by the policeman at moment t iff no
matter how he stops his investigation, at least one of ϕ and ψ will have been proven
when he stops.
The Beth-Reichenbach semantics for classical logic contains a component of pro-
gressive knowledge which is compatible with the progression of knowledge aspects we
find in the miners scenario. Thus we use the Beth-Reichenbach semantics to model the
miners scenario. But first we have to give formal definitions.
The language we use contains atomic formulas q, negations of atoms ¬q, conjunc-
tions and disjunctions. Every well-formed formula is a disjunction of conjunctions of
atoms or their negations, and we do not have implication in our language.
Definition 1 (Beth-Reichenbach semantics for classical logic). Consider the lan-
guage LC of classical propositional logic with atomsQ={p, q, . . .} and the connectives
¬, ∧, ∨. Well-formed formulae (wff) be of the following form ∨
i
∧
j
±qi,j where qi,j is
atomic, +q is q and -q is ¬q. A Beth-Reichenbach model for LC has the form (T,R, h),
where T is a set of reference points (worlds, information states), R ⊆ T × T , (T,R)
is a finite tree. h is an assignment giving a subset h(q)⊆ T to each atomic q . Further-
more, let < be the transitive closure of R, and x ≤ y be x = y or x < y. We require the
following to hold:
(a) For each t∈ T , say that t is an endpoint iff ¬∃x(t< x). Let Et={x ∈ T |t ≤ x
and ¬∃y∈T (x < y)}. Intuitively Et is the set of all endpoints of t. We require that
for each t∈T, Et 6= ∅. This means that: ∀t∃s(t≤s and s is an endpoint).
(b) Et ⊆ h(q) iff t ∈ h(q).
We now define satisfaction of a formula A in a model. We write t|=index A, where
the index gives the type of satisfaction we are defining. In our formalization, there will
be two possible values for index: bs and br. In BS-semantics, we only need satisfaction
on bs, while satisfaction on br will be used in our extended BR-semantics. Satisfaction
on bs in t depends on the truth values at the endpoints and the ones assigned by h in t.
Definition 2 (Satisfaction in bs in Beth-Reichenbach model (T , R, h)).
1. t|=bs q iff t∈h(q), where t∈ T and q atomic
2. t|=bs ¬A iff for all t’, t≤t’ implies t’6|=bs A
3. t|=bs A ∧B iff t|=bs A and t|=bs B.
4. t|=bs A ∨B iff t’|=bs A or t’|=bs B, for all t’∈Et.
Remark 1. The interpretation of the atoms, ¬ and ∨ can be understood as modal S4
interpretation. The atoms q are understood as q, and ¬ and ∨ are understood as ¬
and ∨.
We analyze the miners scenario by dropping condition (b) of Definition 1 to obtain
our BR-semantics. A BR model is defined as an BS model as in Definition 1, but without
condition (b), i.e. there is no connection between Et⊆ h(q) and t∈h(q).
Definition 3 (BR-model). A BR-model has the form of a model of Definition 1 without
requirement (b).
Satisfaction on br is the same as satisfaction on bs, except the condition on nega-
tion. To highlight the difference we use a different symbol for negation, namely ‘∼’.
The second interpretation rule in definition 4 implements close world assumption, and
evaluate a negative atomic formula without looking at the endpoints. In case h does not
assign a positive value to an atom q, then q is asserted as false.
Definition 4 ( Satisfaction |=br in Beth-Reichenbach model (T, R, h) ).
1. t|=br q iff t∈h(q), where t∈T and q atomic
2. t |=br∼ A iff t 6|=br A.
3. t|=br A ∧B iff t|=br A and t|=br B.
4. t|=br A ∨B iff t’|=br A or t’|=br B, for all t’∈Et.
Remark 2. When we evaluate atoms we do not look at the endpoints. On the other hand,
for evaluating disjunction, we look at the endpoints. For example, let T={r,t, s}, r <
t, r < s, and h(Z)={t, s}, h(X)={t}, h(Y)={s}. In this example, the reference point
“r” does not belong to h(Z). This is to show that even if Z may be true at all endpoints,
in br it is false r’. On the other hand, in br (Z ∨ Z) holds at now, according to the
interpretation rule of disjunction. This represents a big difference with respect to our
logic and classical logic. In our logic, it is not true that (Z ∨ Z) |=br Z.
Disjunction constitutes a “connection” between the two kinds of satisfactions we
are going to use (|=br and |=bs). The way formulae are satisfied is different for both
atomic formulae and boolean operators, except the disjunction where we look at the
endpoints in both kinds of satisfaction.
In BR semantics we read disjunction as modal, namely we readA∨B as(A∨B).
So our semantics is modal logic in disguise. The advantage is that we are adding to
classical logic just enough modal properties to address the miners scenario in a natural
way, without having to bring in and commit to a lot of unnecessary modal machinery.
3 A case study: the miners scenario
Several authors provide consistent representations of the miners scenario. Kolodny and
MacFarlane [12] give a detailed discussion of various consistent representations, but
they conclude that the only satisfactory representation of the scenario is to invalidate the
argument from (1.b-d) to (2) by rejecting modus ponens. Willer [16] argues that there
are good reasons to preserve modus ponens and develops another consistent represen-
tation by falsifying monotonicity. Charlow [5] proposes a comprehensive representa-
tion which requires rethinking the relationship between relevant information (what we
know) and practical rankings of possibilities and actions (what to do). Cariani et al. [3]
argue that the traditional Kratzer’s semantics [13] of deontic conditionals is not capable
of representing the scenario satisfactorily. They propose to extend Kratzer’s standard
account by adding a parameter representing a “decision problem” to solve the scenario.
Finally, Carr [4] argues that the proposal of Cariani et al. is still problematic, in that it
packs decision theory in the semantics of modals.
We choose an approach different from the above mentioned treatment. In a nutshell,
instead of invalidating the argument from (1.b-d) to (2), we address the scenario by
making (1.a-d) and (2) compatible. According to our BR-semantics, the problem with
the miners scenario is that we have three reference points. See Figure 1. Each reference
point represents an information state. At now we do not have information where the
miners are. Later, at point l1, we know in which shaft the miners are, and later still
(point l2) we block the correct shaft. The meaning of “(Miners in A ∨Miners in B)” is
that no matter how information evolves, either we have that the assertion “Miners in A”
holds or that “Miners in B” holds.
In a sense, we are operating in modal logic without bringing an explicit modality
into the language, and we read “Either the miners are in shaft A or they are in shaft B”
as  (Either the miners are in shaft A or they are in shaft B.) and we read “we ought
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Fig. 2. Items in our solution to the miners scenario
to block neither shaft” as ¬ block A ∧¬ block B. If we regard the worlds in the
Beth-Reichenbach model as possible worlds with a reflexive and transitive accessibility
relation, then the semantic condition we gave to formulas of the form x ∧ y is as if we
have a necessity operator  in front of it. We can thus have that (X ∨ Y ) ∧ ¬X ∧ ¬Y
can be consistent:
(3.a) now|=br (X ∨ Y ) ∧ ¬X ∧ ¬Y
By instantiating (3.a), we can get (3). We thus have that at reference point now, “(block
A ∨ block B)” is true but “block A” and “block B” are both false.
(3) now|=br (block A ∨ block B) ∧ ¬block A ∧ ¬block B
Moreover, if we add the deontic modal operator ‘©’ to the language, we can in-
stantiate (3.a) differently as in (4) (we will formally define deontic modality below in
Section 5.1).
(4) now|=br (© block A ∨© block B) ∧ ¬© block A ∧ ¬© block B
This means that at now “we ought to block A or we ought to block B” is true but “we
ought to block A ” is false and “we ought to block B ” are false. Therefore (1.a-d) and
(2) are compatible. (4) moreover gives the right prediction to the miners scenario: the
prediction given by (4) is “not block A” and “not block B” at now, although given more
information “we will eventually either block A or block B”.
Some readers may think that we can represent the miners scenario in standard de-
ontic logic (SDL), augmented with a K (Knowledge) modality:
1. ©(¬A ∧ ¬B)
2. KA→©A
3. KB →©B
4. K(A ∨B)
Now ©A ∨ ©B, which would conflict with 1, is not derivable. This could be a
simple and effective solution based on recognizing the epistemic context. However,
SDL has its problems and of course we need to give problems free axioms for the
©,K logic.
The perceptive reader might think that the Beth-Reichenbach semantics approach
seems to provide a solution by coincidence. This is not the case. Indeed that there is
an epistemic reading of the Beth-Reichenbach semantics itself enabling it to give a
solution. Given that SDL has its problems we believe that it is better to offer a simple
well known semantics , namely the Beth-Reichenbach semantics. The question to ask
now is whether we can use the Beth-Reichenbach semantics to solve the difficulties of
SDL. This could be a future research, where SDL is based on intuitionistic logic.
4 Reactive semantics
We now describe the ReBR-semantics. This is an intermediate semantics where we
augment BR models with reactive double arrows, as defined in Gabbay [11], but no
actions. It is only a temporary step, for reasons of exposition, to lead the reader towards
the final ReBRA semantics with actions. The reactive arrows are not needed to solve the
miners scenario but it is compatible with it and can expand and solve other problems
related to multi-agent and their respective progression of knowledge in time.
So we explain the idea with a diagram. Consider Figure 3. As the agents traverse an
arc, if there is a double arrow emanating from the arc to another arc, the double arrow
will disconnect the target arc.
•a1 • a2
•
x
•z•y
•
w
•
e1
•
e2
•
e3
Fig. 3. Double arrow model
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Fig. 4. Model for Figure 3 enriched with actions
and reactivity
So if an agent passes through the path a2→x→z→w, passing through the arc
x→z, the double arrow (x→z)→→(w→e3) gets active and disconnects (blocks) the
arc (w→e3). Similarly, if the agent moves to node w along the path a1→x→y→w, then
he cannot go to e1 because by passing through y→w there is a double arrow disconnects
the arow from w to e1. We identify an agent with the path of the following form:
Π = (x1, x2, . . . , xn), such that:
x1 → x2 → x3 → . . .→ xn
x1 is the starting point of the agent and xn is the current point of the agent. Math-
ematically, if ((xi, xi+1), (u, v)) is a double arrow, then u → v is blocked, in case
xi → xi+1 is in Π . We say in this case that u → v is blocked by Π . In particular, we
may have that (u→ v)∈ Π .
Now, we continue to explain the diagram in Figure 3. e1, e2, and e3 are endpoints,
while x, y, and z are reference points without being endpoints. In the BS-semantics
for this figure, atomic formulae may be true or false at the reference points. Their value
is given in terms of an assignment h. On the other hand, complex formulae (negation,
disjunctions, and conjunctions) are evaluated in terms of the truth values of the atoms
at the endpoints above them according with the interpretation rules given in Defini-
tion 2 for the BS-semantics. In other words, atomic values are always given, while for
evaluating complex formulae we must look at the endpoints.
The role of reactivity is in the notion of what it means to be above a point. For an
endpoint e to be above a point t we need to have a path from t leading to e such that
none of its arcs are blocked by the path itself. For example, the path y → w → e1
blocks its own arc w→ e1. If the agent goes to w through y, he can reach the endpoints
{e2, e3}, while if he goes from x to w through z he can reach {e1, e2}. This means
that passing the path from x to z does not let the agent reach the endpoint e3.
We define now a legitimate path.
Definition 5 (Legitimate path). Given a set of point S and a relation R⊆S×S and a
relation R∗⊆R×R, a path Π is legitimate if it does not block itself, i.e. if there is not an
arc in Π that activates a double arrow in R∗ that blocks another arc in Π .
Two paths can be concatenated if the last point of one is the starting point of the other.
We refer to the concatenation of two paths Π and Π ′ via the notation Π ∗Π ′
Definition 6. A reactive Beth-Reichenbach model for LC has the form (T, R, R∗, h),
where T is a set of worlds, R ⊆ T × T, R∗ ⊆ R × R, and h is an assignment giving a
subset h(q)⊆T for each atomic q.
We require the following to hold: Given a path Π with last point t, let EΠ be the
set of all endpoints x such that there exists a path Π ′ beginning with t and ending
with x such that the concatenation of Π with Π ′ is legitimate. We require that for each
legitimate Π , EΠ 6= ∅. Note that this means that every legitimate path has an endpoint
above it that can be legitimetely reached.
Definition 7. Satisfaction |=br in reactive Beth-Reichenbach model (T, R, R∗, h), with
respect to a legitimate path Π .
1. (Π |=br q) iff t is in h(q), where q is atomic and t is the last point of Π .
2. (Π |=br ¬A) iff (Π 6|=br A).
3. (Π |=br A ∧ B) iff (Π |=br A) ∧ (Π |=br B)
4. (Π |=br X ∨ Y) iff in any endpoint t ∈ EΠ we have: either (t |=br X) or (t |=br Y)
5 Action involved model
In this section we add action to our semantics. We begin with an explanation and then
give a formal definition. Consider Figure 5. In the state a1 Mary has the laptop. John
wants the laptop and in state x John has the laptop. On our previous model there is
nothing else to say. We do not know in what way John has become the owner of the
laptop. In our new model we want to add actions and specify that the move from a1 to
x was the result of an action. Let us list (all) the actions available to John.
– Action α: steal the laptop
– Action β: buy the laptop
– Action γ: buy insurance for the laptop
Insure
laptop
here
y
x
John has the laptop
Mary has no laptop
a
1
Mary has the laptop
John has no laptop
z
Fig. 5. A model explaining the need of actions
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Fig. 6. Model of Figure 5 enriched with actions
In our new model we need to write annotation as to which action was used in the tran-
sitions. Therefore if John stole the laptop then he cannot insure it. So we have Figure 7.
But if he bought the laptop then he can insure it. So we have Figure 8.
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Fig. 7.
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Fig. 8.
Therefore, in our modelization, reactive arrows define a dependency among actions.
Action α can block the execution of action γ. This is like a deontic rule on action: α
→O(¬ γ). Indeed, Gabbay [10] uses reactive arrows to give semantics to contrary-to-
duty obligations.
In other words, we have an opportunity to use the reactive arrows, in the following
sense: if the laptop is stolen it ought not to be insured. Therefore we model this deon-
tic/legal rule in Figure 8 using annotated arrows with actions to indicate which action
was taken to move across the arrows and we also annotate double arrows by actions to
indicate what actions activate the double arrow.
The double arrow (a1 →α x)→→α (x→γ y) cancels (x→γ y), but the double arrow
(a1 →β x)→→α (x→γ y) does not cancel (x→γ y), because α is different from β (the
laptop was bought, not stolen). So for a reactive cancellation to work (t1 →γ t2)→→ε
(s1 →η s2), we must have γ=ε.
Note that the above extra action structure does not affect our solution of the miners
scenario. It just gives extra information. Consider Figure 4, which is an extension of
Figure 3 with action annotations. An action symbol annotating an arc in the figure
represents the action which triggered the transition indicated by this arc. Again, note
that the arrow (x→ y) is not cancelled, because β 6= α,
5.1 The nature of action
In our model, we need two pure types of actions:
Knowledge information actions. For example, let us introduce the action δ = “get info
about the location of the miners”. δ is non-deterministic we can find out the miners
are in shaft A or in shaft B.
Facts actions For example, let us introduce the action ε = “kill all the miners”. ε also
yields information, e.g. that all miners are dead.
In order to model actions, it is necessary to add a definition of how actions are to be
executed, and what is the form of actions. We adopt a traditional AI view:
Action α: (precondition, postcondition)
Both precondition and postcondition are represented by wff of our language LC . In the
miners scenario we have:
Action block-A: (miners in A, A is blocked)
Action block-B: (miners in B, B is blocked)
The two actions are blocked when their preconditions do not hold at the current
reference point. For example, most likely the action “kill all the miners” cannot be
executed because there could be severe preconditions to execute the action, e.g. finding
out that the miners are terrorist hiding in the shaft.
5.2 ReBRA-semantics
Having introduced all ingredients, namely basic BR-Semantics, reactivity and actions,
we are ready now to define our final semantics, which we call ReBRA-Semantics.
Definition 8. ReBRA-Semantics model.
Let (S, R), R⊆ S× S be a finite network. This is our basic set of states/worlds/reference
points and the transition relation R. Let E be the set of endpoints of (S, R), i.e. e ∈E
iff ¬∃y(eRy). Let < be the transitive closure of R and let x ≤ y be x = y or x < y.
Let Et = {set of all endpoints s such that t≤s }. We also have a stock of actions A of
the form α=(Preα, Postα), where Preα is a statement being the precondition of α and
Postα is the postcondition. Then:
A model is a system with (S, R, R∗, A, h), where S is the set of states, A is the set of
actions, R⊆S×S, and R∗⊆A×R×R, and for each atomic q, h(q)⊆S.
Satisfaction of a model is given with respect to an annotated path:
Definition 9. Annotated paths.
Taken S, R, and A of definition 8, let Π=(s0, s1, . . . , sk) to denote a path. We have
siRsi+1, 0≤ i ≤ k. We also write s0→ s1→ . . .→ sk. A path is the history of the
agent as he moves around the network from one state to the next. s0 is the beginning
state of the path and sk is the last state of the path.
An annotated pathΠ has the form (s0→α0 s1→α1 . . .→αk−1 sk). This is a path where
each transition siRsi+1 is labelled by actions. We imagine an agent moving along the
path (s0 → s1 → . . .→ sk). Each move from state si to state si+1 is done by action
αi. s0 is where the agent started and sk is where the agent is currently situated. Arrows
annotated by actions are elements of A× S× S.
We also have annotated reactive double arrows:
Annotated reactive double arrows have the form (t→s)→→α(x→y), where t, s∈S,
tRs, x,y∈S, xRy. The annotated double arrows are elements in A× R×R .
We need now to define satisfaction in a model.
Definition 10. Satisfaction, Legitimacy, and Coherence with respect to actions. Let Π
be an annotated path. Π is a legitimate annotated path iff both (a) and (b) hold.
(a) There does not exist two arcs of the form x→αy and u→βv in Π such that
(x→αy)→→α(u→βv) is in R∗. I.e. (α, (α, x, y), (β, u, v)) ∈ R∗.
(b) Whenever x→αy is in the path then Πx |=br A, where Πx is the initial path of Π
up to node x and A is the precondition of α and |=br is the br-satisfaction defined
in the next item 3.
Two paths can be concatenated if the last point of one is the starting point of the other.
We refer to the concatenation of two paths Π and Π ′ via the notation Π ∗Π ′.
Let Π be a legitimate path. We define EΠ , the set of legitimate endpoints of Π , is de-
fined as follows: a point t is in EΠ iff t is an endpoint and for some Π ′ such that the
first element of Π ′ is equal to the last element of Π and the last element of Π ′ is t and
Π ∗Π ′ is legitimate.
Finally, let Π be a legitimate path. We define satisfaction |=br as follows:
(a) (Π |=br q) iff t is in h(q), where q is atomic and t is the last point of Π .
(b) (Π |=br ¬A) iff (Π 6|=br A).
(c) (Π |=br A ∧ B) iff (Π |=br A) ∧ (Π |=br B)
(d) (Π |=br X ∨ Y) iff in any endpoint t ∈ EΠ we have: either (t |=br X) or (t |=br Y)
The last component we need to complete our formal framework is a mechanism that
allows agents to choose the actions they will execute, among those available.
In the present paper, given an action “α: (prec(α), post(α))” and a path Π whose last
point is t, we say that α can be executed given Π iff Π |=br prec(α) holds. In other
words, we understand every action as a conditional norm. There we define an action to
be obligatory iff the precondition of the action is satisfied. Formally,
Definition 11. Obligatory actions.
Π |=br ©α iff Π |=br prec(α)
Agents must execute all actions whose precondition holds.
Of course, actions could be selected in other different ways. According to [4], actions
should be ranked according to probability, expected values, goals of the agents, etc. The
present account only uses agents in deontic mode, i.e. agents are always obligated to
perform an action when the preconditions hold, while an extension to ordinary action is
left as future work.
Given the definition of obligation in def.11, we deduce the following:
(5) if Π 2br prec(α), then Π |=br ¬© α.
In the miners scenario, (5) can be used to derive ¬© block A and ¬© block B as long
as the precondition of block A and block B are not satisfied in the reference point now.
6 Using ReBRA-semantics for the miners scenario
We now illustrate the use of actions in the context of the miners scenario. We are not
going to use reactive arrows for the moment. Figure 2 becomes now Figure 9. Let us
summarize figure 9. At now we have true that: “A is not blocked”, “B is not blocked”,
“A is blocked ∨ B is blocked”. We do not know where the miners are. We take action
“get-info” and get two non-deterministic results: “t1: miners in A” and “t2: miners
in B”.
The preconditions of the action “get-info” is >. Therefore, we can get-info at any
point. The postcondition of “get-info” is that we know where the miners are and so we
reduce the number of endpoints. After the execution of get-info, for instance, we could
move to either t1 or t2 so that we will see a single endpoint.
We take action “block-A” at t1. We take action “block-B” at t2. We get s1 and
s2 respectively. However, at now, actions “block-A” cannot be executed because we
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kA ^ :blokB ^ (blo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kB)
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Fig. 9. Items in the miners scenario with actions
require the precondition of “block-A” to be “miners in A”, and similarly for the action
“block-B”. We therefore accept “not ought to block A” at reference point now by re-
ferring the Kantian law “ought implies can”. Moreover, we take for granted that at t1
“ought to block A” is true and at t2 “ought to block B” is true. Then by the semantics
of disjunction we have “ought to block A or ought to block B” is true at now. That is
to say, we have (4) in the miners scenario. As we state at the end of Section 3, (4) is
logically consistent in our semantics and gives the right prediction.
7 Related work
We have proposed a new approach based on reactive semantics that appears to be
promising for handling normative multi-agents systems [7] and their respective pro-
gression of knowledge in time. We used our new logic in this paper to specifically
solve a well-known puzzle that recently gained popularity in the scientific community:
the miners scenario. This section highlights the differences between our approach and
some recent solutions to that scenario in the literature.
Several authors observe that the paradox arises by applying deduction rules that are
commonly assumed to be valid in deontic logic, and they propose a revision of such
rules. [12] examine various options, i.e. rejecting either one of the premises or one of
the three deduction rules used in the derivation (disjunction introduction, disjunction
elimination, or modus ponens). They come to the conclusion that we must reject modus
ponens for indicative conditionals. The validity of modus ponens - they argue - must be
“information-sensitive”, i.e. it must be defined with respect to the knowledge that is at
the disposal of the agent at the time of the inference.
Other authors do not accept the solution by [12], focussed on modus ponens, arguing
that contextual (pragmatic) preferences ought to be included in the semantics of modal
operators. [3] and [5] belong to this school of thought. They modify the semantics of
modal operators by including some kinds of decision rules that allow prefererence for
one of the available options, so that inconsistency does not arise.
Some have questioned this solution, e.g. Carr and Willer [4], [16]. Carr, in partic-
ular, shows that encapsulating pragmatic decision rules within the meaning of modals
- a solution that seems at odds with standard literature on modals - makes the formal
framework too rigid. It is no longer possible, for instance, to rank the available actions
that an agent can perform according to the probability of getting the expected outcome.
With respect to the miners scenario, for instance, it is not possible to model a scenario
where the agent knows that there is a 99% probability that the miners are in shaft A,
and so he could decide to take the risk and block the shaft.
We acknowledge that Carr is on the right track. However, in our view, she has not
fully achieved the goal of keeping pragmatic constraints distinct from the semantics.
Carr’s work started from a question by Krazter and von Fintel: “why pack information
about rational decision making into the meaning of modals?”. She developed a formal
theory where preference rules are asserted in terms of separate (context-dependent)
functions that affect the truth conditions of modals and conditionals, but they are not
part of the formal representations of their meaning. She states that the decision rules
regarding actions only “determine the meanings of modals”.
Although this allows for a more expressive and flexible management of pragmatic
constraints, modals still need decision rules to be interpreted in a model. In other words,
we do not achieve neat independence between semantics and pragmatics if the choice
of a certain action is needed to determine the truth values of modals and conditionals.
Our basic BR-semantics is already capable of solving the miners scenario as it
adopts a different account of disjunction. Disjunctions, used to express limited knowl-
edge, are interpreted with respect to the endpoints, not the current reference point. In
this respect, our approach is more similar to that of [12]. However, rather than rejecting
modus ponens, we reject disjunction introduction since in our logic “A→(A ∨ B)” does
not hold. We have also shown that our basic BR-semantics may be extended with ac-
tions into a new semantics that we call ReBR-semantics, to enable the implementation
of all pragmatic preferences and constraints that affect the selection of the proper ac-
tions to be taken. A complete and exhaustive formalization of such constraints, however,
deserves much further work.
8 Conclusion
This paper presents the following contributions. First, we show how a linguistic inter-
pretation of deontic paradoxes can be used to further develop deontic logic, by intro-
ducing a special Beth-Reichenbach semantics and using it to represent the single agent
decision problem of the miner’s scenario. In further research we will complete this ar-
gument, for example by extending the semantics with a deontic modal operator, or by
using the language as a base logic in the input/output logic framework.
Second, we give a new analysis of the single agent decision problem of the min-
ers scenario. We bring modal meaning to disjunction which mirror our intuitions and
eliminates the cause of the scenario, without bringing in the full machinery of modal or
non-classical logic.
Third, we augment the BR-semantics with reactive arrows and actions, obtaining a
new semantic that we call ReBR- and ReBRA-semantics. In future work we will illus-
trate how this extended semantics can be used to represent the multi-agent dialogues of
the miners scenario.
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